Context, control, and calculation
A safe rule of thumb in examining the uses of gaming is that there is no universal right type of experimental gaming to fit all circumstances. The disconnection between the experimental and the military operational gaming community is distressing, especially when one realizes that the expenditures in operational gaming are several orders of magnitude greater. However, the discussion here is constrained to teaching and experimentation. Social scientists often suffer from "real science" envy. They remember the elementary physics lab and dream of doing properly controlled experiments in sociology, economics, or social psychology. Unfortunately, there are many aspects of the enculturation and memories of individual humans that limit the analogies we can make with hard science. In particular, the atoms in economics experiments are individuals who come equipped with social conditioning, language, and memory of individual experience. When they come to an experiment, their memories and conditioning cannot be wiped out. In their work on game theory, Shapley and Shubik suggested that the condition of "external symmetry" be made explicit in game models (see Shubik, 1982, p. 16 ). This condition indicates that unless explicitly modeled otherwise, all aspects of the players are assumed to be the same. In fact, they never are. At best, the economic experimenter can suggest that as a first order approximation, the individuals are sufficiently similar. When experimenting, the social psychologist is frequently, explicitly concerned with individual differences. The emphasis is on characterizing the distribution of behavior in performing the same task. Differences in skill and perception are of psychological and economic concern.
The mere fact that individuals come to an experiment with the baggage of enculturation and personality may have a perverse influence on the "dust-free" experiment. If the context is made too clean or too impoverished, the influence of the controls may be perverse. Because the environment is context-free or too stark, individual history and memory may be used by the players to supply their own cues. The introduction of the computer console and the gaming laboratory impose considerable and not necessarily desirable special structure on games. Certain environments such as the command center in an aircraft carrier or a stock market trading desk are manmade artifacts that can be simulated reasonably accurately in any game. But even there the influence of 2 months at sea or 6 months of trading in a down market are left out. Little details such as the differences in how data are entered or how bad the time compression is when compared with the "real thing" may easily introduce artifacts. When the environment is impoverished, the influence of differences in wording instructions is magnified. The importance to motivation on how much individuals are paid (in contrast to a Hawthorne effect) is still an open question.
The best way to study risk behavior in gambling might be to set up observations of individuals using their own money in Las Vegas. These observations are made not as an argument against those who like to perform heavily controlled laboratory experiments with paid subjects but to suggest that one might be able glean useful insights from other and less formal uses of gaming. One might even be able to learn from asking individuals for their opinions concerning how certain games should be played. The nature of both the game and the context in which it is run depend heavily on the question being asked.
The purpose and pros and cons of games in teaching
My stress was and is to utilize games to help convey basic concepts in game theory in such a way that both the value and the limits of game theory could be illustrated. The precise analytical language of game theory that has led to its successes has also amply illustrated its weaknesses. Works such as that of Tom Schelling (1960) or recent popular elementary texts such as that of Dixit and Nalebuff (1991) are replete with stories and games rich in specific context. Each indicates in a different way the enormous scope of strategic analysis exposited for a variety of purposes. The uses of game theory and gaming vary heavily from discipline to discipline.
In many ways, good games in social psychology, sociology, and political science are harder to design and interpret, and are more important than games used in teaching principles of game theory, economics, and business; but we concentrate on the latter. The games of Rubinstein (1999) stress principles of pure game theory, and those of Holt (1999) emphasize economics.
The article of Rubinstein (1999) recounted his experiences with two undergraduate courses in game theory in 1998 and 1999. Most of the games were variations of noncooperative games, several were zero-sum games, several were ultimatum games, and some were games played in extensive form, as well as several others. The stress was on teaching game theory. Context was minimal: Some were pure abstract games, others had minimal stories (such as the BATTLE OF THE SEXES or PRISONER'S DILEMMA), a few involved economic situations with bargaining, another considered an ambush, and another had the manipulation of an election. Rubinstein (1999) made a case for the value of the crude in-class experiments as a source of valuable experimental insights. He stated, "It is argued that the crude experimental methods produced results which are not substantially different from those obtained at much higher cost using stricter experimental methods."
In contrast to Rubinstein (1999) , Holt, in his article on classroom experiments (1999) and in his special feature in Economic Perspectives, concentrates on games in teaching economics. In each instance the game has an economic scenario.
My own use of gaming in teaching has differed somewhat from both the uses of Rubinstein and Holt. The games reported on were used primarily in various classes in teaching game theory from 1961 to 1992. The class title was "Game Theory in the Social Sciences." The goal was to give the students an appreciation of the problems involved in conceptualizing strategic thinking. The stress was more on concepts than technique. The textbook eventually was Game Theory in the Social Sciences. For the most part the students were undergraduates (seniors) or master of business administration (MBA) students at Yale. Some games were run in lectures given elsewhere in the United States, Austria, Australia, Canada, Chile, India, and Hong Kong. One game on a double auction market (as indicated below) was (and still is) run in classes on the history and theory of money and financial institutions. Another game, A BUSINESS GAME FOR TEACHING AND EXPERIMENTAL PURPOSES, was utilized (in several variations) in formal experiments at Systems Development Corporation, in a less formal mode at the International Business Machines corporation, and in several classes on industrial organization, oligopoly theory, and corporate planning.
The DOLLAR AUCTION GAME (Shubik, 1971) , SO LONG SUCKER (Hausner et al., 1964) , and an unpublished board game entitled KREMLIN were all aimed at illustrating specific points in the design of games with specific properties. The key feature in the first game was escalation; in the second game, the incentives to form nonenforceable coalitions and the incentives to double-cross one's partner; and a key feature in the third game was the role of the "mole," or hidden traitor. These games were all run informally for entertainment.
In all of the uses of gaming for teaching in the social sciences, there is a basic unifying theme. We are dealing with process. A game is defined by its formal and informal rules. The formal rules are often written down and made explicit, whereas the informal rules are contained in the context of the surroundings and situation in which the game is played. Together, the rules provide the carriers of process.
The use of games in class provides several benefits. Not only do they involve the active participation of the students, but in my classes they were used to raise basic questions concerning the relationship between a game and the reality it is meant to represent. Emphasis was also laid on the concept of what constitutes a solution. In both economic theory and game theory, much stress has been given to equilibrium analysis.
Process is far harder to analyze than equilibrium. The use of games enables us to sensitize the students to the difficulties involved in relating process studies to equilibrium studies. How does price form in a market, and does it approach an equilibrium level? Are noncooperative equilibrium strategies selected by naive or nonsophisticated individuals? The specific games dealt with below illustrate some of the questions and answers raised by both the playing of the games and the structure of the games themselves.
Turning to the experimental use of games, it is my belief that the future of experimental gaming and the development of new game theory lies in the closer melding of the approaches of psychology, sociology, economics, and history, where the unifying theme is process analysis of (at most) locally optimizing agents. Much of the individual optimizing behavior taught in microeconomics and operations research treats economics as a nonsocial science. The implicit argument is that in a mass economy, the individual is so small relative to the market that a large n-person market can be regarded as a parallel set of n one-person games against an anonymous mechanism. The results from the uses of games in classes on game theory and economics illustrate that even in games with many players the sociopsychological feedbacks can only be ignored when answering a narrow set of questions. Furthermore, individual differences are clearly manifested even in playing completely symmetric games.
Emerging from the experiences with gaming over many years, together with the development of viewing and recording devices, personal computers, and the Web, basic new opportunities are being presented. In particular, there is now the opportunity for mass data gathering from large groups of individuals carrying out self-selected activities by providing games to be played on the Web. In the social sciences, there has been a long-lasting debate on in vivo versus in vitro observation. Both are called for. Fully controlled laboratory exercises tend to be expensive, time consuming, and affordable for only small sample sizes. Class or Web games lack controls but are highly economical. The results from games played in class may be looked at as a valuable, virtually costless source of insight into the behavior of the players. 2 There are several downside features in the utilization of games in class. The first is that the design of an effective noncomputerized game to be played by 20 or more individuals in a classroom in a few minutes or fraction of an hour is a nontrivial task. One alternative is to build a complete course around a set of games, such as was done by Howard Raiffa on bargaining and negotiations. If a regular course is taught in an establishment with a gaming laboratory, the games can be computerized with a great timesaving and simplification of data processing. But possibly the most important consideration in the utilization of gaming in class is to make sure that not only are the points to be illustrated clear but that the emphasis is more on the debriefing or the postgame analysis than on the play. Furthermore, the postgame analysis must include a discussion of how reasonable or natural a representation of a strategic situation is provided by the game. A sophisticated analysis of a simple game almost always dominates a simple analysis of a sophisticated game.
What is regarded as sophisticated by an economist is easily regarded as simplistic by a social psychologist and vice versa. The history of gaming for teaching, experimentation, and operational purposes has shown that it is difficult but valuable to promote interdisciplinary approaches to gaming. Fortunately, in the past few years the level of collaboration has grown along with the understanding of the inadequacy of the models of the individual, rational decision maker.
On experimental games
Although much of the current teaching of game theory in economics departments and business schools stresses noncooperative theory, there is a large body of cooperative theory stressing solutions such as the core and value and other cooperative solutions. 3 The original mathematical work on noncooperative equilibria was directed at games in strategic form, which usually meant games represented by matrices of payoffs. Much of the discussion concerning the noncooperative equilibrium attributes behavioral justification to the equilibrium. There is little evidence that this is so, in general. How a one-shot matrix game is played does not appear to conform with any generality to the noncooperative equilibrium. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) have devoted considerable ingenuity in attempting to provide an axiomatic and normative justification for the noncooperative equilibrium. The cooperative solution concepts are openly normative and in some instances such as the value (Shapley, 1953) have been used as the recommended way to solve problems in the imputation of joint economic usage. Concepts such as joint optimality, fairness, and symmetry are all utilized as axioms in constructing these solution concepts.
Much of the experimental work has been directed at multistage games. The pioneering work of Rapoport, Guyer, and Gordon (1976) recorded experiments with all of the 78 ordinally different 2 × 2 games (without tied entries).
When one considers the playing of multistage games, the dichotomy between cooperative and noncooperative theories is no longer clear and one may wish to consider the meaning of reputation, coordination, implicit collusion, and quasi-cooperation. In particular, the limitations of the pure economics or game theorist approaches are shown clearly in attempts to study dynamic or multistage games. Evidence is clear that phenomena such as revenge and other emotions play an important role. The work on ultimatum bargaining illustrates the importance of fairness.
Even at the level of two-person zero-sum games, context and professional training appear to be relevant. An early PhD thesis of R. I. Simon (1967) utilized business school and military science majors playing a two-person zero-sum game with three scenarios for the quantitatively same game. One scenario was based on business, one was military, and one was abstract. Different results were obtained in all instances.
Games in class
The games utilized in my classes, together with the results and interpretations, are discussed below. Several of the games involved the examination of cooperative game theory solutions. Both the various solutions to games in coalitional form and the Nash equilibrium to a game in strategic form present a mathematical analysis of a static situation. Frequently, a verbal description with a dynamical story is attached.
My uses of games in class were directed to exploring the relationships among various game theory assumptions and solutions and student opinion and behavior. Their purpose was both to teach the concepts of game theory and to "sweeten the intuition" concerning model building in the social sciences. Originally, I had not contemplated more value to the processing of the data than to provide feedback for the class. But after several years, it appeared that the regularities were sufficient to merit other consideration. The games utilized in class or in lectures were in the following list of experimental games: Only the first six games are discussed here. Two further articles will cover the discussion of the remaining games.
A report on the games
The results from several of these games have been published and reported in detail elsewhere. When this is so, the references are given and only a brief discussion is noted here.
Games in coalitional form (Games 1a, 1b, and 6)
The first three exercises were used in teaching cooperative game solutions. The three cooperative game solution concepts considered were the core, the value, and the nucleolus, as well as the price system (which requires an economic story to locate it if the core is large) and the symmetric or even-split point. Intuitively, the core is the set of ways of splitting the proceeds from full cooperation against which no coalition can propose an alternative that they prefer and could achieve if they acted independently.
The value of a game gives each individual his or her a priori expected combinatoric marginal value considering the worth of an individual's entry into all coalitions. In other words, it considers the entry of an individual into all possible coalitions as a random event, calculates the extra worth to the coalition created by the addition of the individual, and averages over all of the contributions.
The nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) is the division of the proceeds from full cooperation (technically, an imputation) for which the difference between what it offers and what any coalition can achieve is minimized. It is the point at which the maximum complaint by any coalition is minimized. A simple two-person example provides an illustration. Suppose that individual A can obtain 1 by acting alone and that B can obtain 3. Together they can obtain 6. The split (2.5, 3.5) has the property that they share the surplus or excess obtained by cooperation, equally.
The competitive equilibrium is obtained by constructing an associated economy that is represented by the game and solving for the efficient price system. Unlike the other solutions suggested, it requires that the game have a sufficient economic structure that guarantees its existence. 4 The even split point can be regarded as an egalitarian solution that ignores the influence or power of subgroups (see Shubik, 1986) . It is in the spirit of each contributing to their full ability but consuming equally.
The three games were utilized to illustrate the properties of the different solutions and to show how these solutions were influenced by changes in powers of the coalitions. The information on the gain through cooperation was displayed by means of a characteristic function.
The characteristic functions for Games 1a, 1b, and 6 are shown below. A, B, and C are the names of the players, and v(AC) indicates the amount that players A and C can obtain by collaborating. Game 1a has a fat core (i.e., there are many divisions of 400 units that are more than all members of all coalitions could get by themselves). Game 1b has a single-point core with a division of (0, 0, 400), that is, with all gain going to player C (this is also the competitive equilibrium of any associated economy). Game 6 has no core whatsoever. There is no way of reconciling subgroup and group rationality.
My conjectures were that when the students were asked to act as a judge, normatively deciding how the proceeds should be split among the players, a point in the core would be most probably selected when the core was large; however, with a one-point, highly nonsymmetric core, the frequency of selection would be considerably attenuated. It would, however, be higher if an economic scenario were supplied. I had no clear conjecture for Game 6 with no core whatsoever. In all instances, I asked the students to provide a verbal description or rationalization for their choice. Table 1 shows the percentage of points in the core contrasting the relatively large core (3/16 of all possible payoffs) with the single-point core (which was also the unique competitive equilibrium). 5 The total sample size was 321 individuals for Game 1a and 340 for Game 1b.
A detailed analysis, which includes an international comparison as well as students contrasted with game theorists, is given in Shubik (1986) . Here, we observe that the distinction between the percentage of points selected in the core for the two games is striking and significant. In the second game, 187/340 (55%) chose the imputation (100, 100, 200), which could be arrived at by considering the symmetric game with a union of (1, 2) against 3, where 1 and 2 split the proceeds of an even split of 200 each with 3.
In Game 6 (with no core), the most popular choice was the even split (133.3, 133.3, 133.3), but only 13.4% made this selection. There was considerable variation in the selections with little support for either the value or the nucleolus.
In the discussion and debriefing, it appeared that the value and nucleolus were not intuitively easy to grasp. They were regarded as too sophisticated and mathematical. The core was more or less naturally comprehended but was rejected when it was too biased or nonsymmetric. The single-point core was chosen deliberately to be unfair and was perceived as such by the students. When there was no core to provide a justification for a solution where no coalition could do better by playing alone, the symmetric division provided only a weak focal point.
The outcomes did not appear to be culture-or profession-free in the games in India and Australia (Shubik, 1986) . The latter tended more than the former to fair division considerations.
The name of the game (Game 2)
The basic reason why most of the matrix game experimentation and didactic examples have been confined to 2 × 2 matrix games is because they provide the simplest set of examples of matrix games with which one can investigate anonymous or non-faceto-face interactive behavior.
There are 78 strategically different 2 × 2 games with no ties in an individual's preferences. If ties are included, the number of games is of the order of 700. When we extend the analysis to 3 × 3 matrices, we find that there are around 65 × 10 9 strategically Game 1980 Game 1981 Game 1983 Game 1984 Game 1985 Game 1988 Game 1989 illustration. Suppose that individual A can obtain 1 by acting alone and that B can obtain 3. Together they can obtain 6. The split (2.5, 3.5) has the property that they share the surplus or excess obtained by cooperation, equally. The competitive equilibrium is obtained by constructing an associated economy that is represented by the game and solving for the efficient price system. Unlike the other solutions suggested, it requires that the game have a sufficient economic structure that guarantees its existence. 4 The even split point can be regarded as an egalitarian solution that ignores the influence or power of subgroups (see Shubik, 1986) . It is in the spirit of each contributing to their full ability but consuming equally.
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My conjectures were that when the students were asked to act as a judge, normatively deciding how the proceeds should be split among the players, a point in the core would be most probably selected when the core was large; however, with a one-point, highly nonsymmetric core, the frequency of selection would be considerably
BATTLE OF THE SEXES.
A couple wants to go out for an evening's entertainment. They agree to go to the same event or not go at all. She prefers to go to a basketball game than to the ballet, and he prefers to go to the ballet than to a basketball game. They both prefer going out somewhere together rather than not going out at all.
CHICKEN. Two California hot-rodders drive in different cars down an empty road at high speed toward each other. Each has one set of the wheels of the car on the center strip markings. If they both stay on course they will crash. If one or both of them veers from the center strip, the crash will be avoided, but whoever veers will be deemed to be chicken.
The games were presented to the students in the form above with no titles and no story. They were presented as abstract games. The students played the games and were then given the three titles and were asked to match the games with the titles. The games were played in eight classes. Table 5 shows the percentage of the class that correctly identified the name with the game.
There appears to be some support that numbers tell a story for the BATTLE OF THE SEXES but little for the other two. After the students were told the names, for the most part they agreed that the names were reasonable. But the percentage of correct guesses indicates at best a fairly weak association.
There are many different stories that can be constructed to fit the same payoff matrix, and the way the game is played appears to depend on the stories that invoke a context for the player's behavior.
Psychological considerations (Games 3, 4, and 5)
Interpersonal comparisons. When games are played once by anonymous players, a frequent game theory assumption is that only the ordering of the payoffs of the competitor matters. To examine this assumption among naive players, in 1980, 1981, and 1983 three matrices were considered. In 1984 and subsequently, a fourth (zerosum) matrix game was added as a check. The games were utilized nine times in total. The students all selected the strategies for Player 1. After the students had played, the lecture and the discussion were on under what circumstances were interpersonal comparisons of utility a reasonable assumption. The three 2 × 2 matrix games A, B, and C utilized are shown in Tables 6 through 8 . They are games with two Pareto optimal noncooperative equilibria, selected so that one equilibrium favors one player and the other favors the other player.
The matrix in Table 7 is constructed from Table 6 by multiplying the payoffs to Player 1 by 100. The matrix in Table 8 is constructed from Table 6 by multiplying the payoffs to Player 2 by 100.
If the size of the numbers and interpersonal comparisons between the payoffs to Player 1 and Player 2 do not matter, then all three games should be played the same way. Table 9 shows the choices made. The symbol 111 indicates that the same choice (Strategy 1) was made in each game. If the respondents were uninfluenced by a comparison of payoffs, they should choose either 111 or 222. Selection of 111 or 222 amounted to 38.6% of the choices.
A simple zero-sum game was utilized six times with the above games, merely as a comprehension or rationality check. The results showed that error or irrational behavior was slight in the play of the zero-sum game. On analyzing the responses for 1980, 1981, and 1983 , it was observed that many of the respondents treated the three games as if they were playing the same (unknown) competitor; thus, there was the possibility for quid pro quo, as was indicated explicitly in many of the verbal descriptions. From 1983 onward, I changed the instructions to read, "You are going to play each game once, against a different unknown competitor." This removed the possibility for quid pro quo. But this serves as an example where without specifying that each game is against a different competitor immediately leaves the opportunity for the respondents to explore quid pro quo even with a totally unknown competitor.
Prominence or symmetry. This brief note revisits and extends the data for an elementary game related to the experiment and analysis of Stone's (1958) and Schelling's (1960) comments on prominence and focal points. The results for the Yale runs from 1980 to 1991 have been reported in a previous publication (Shubik, 1994) . Figure 1 shows an elementary game that was handed out in class or during a lecture. The points N (the Nash bargaining point solution) and E (the equal split solution) were not labeled. The instructions to the respondents were as follows: Players 1 and 2 move simultaneously without knowledge of each other's moves. Player 2's strategy is to draw a horizontal line, whereas Player 1 will draw a vertical line. If the two lines intersect within (or on the boundary of) the diagram, that is their payoff. If it is outside, they both obtain zero.
The hypothesis was that the distribution of responses would be bimodal, with the split being between the point of prominence (8, 4) and the fair division or equal payoff point of (40/7, 40/7) each. Table 10 shows the total frequency for all games and the frequency for the two additional games beyond the Yale data.
We observe that the selection is strongly bimodal, with approximately 39% of the students choosing the Schelling salient point at 4 and 38% choosing the equal split point at 5.7. The class discussion centered on what constituted a salient point, how a salient point comes into being, and whether it depends on the training, experience, or cultural backgrounds of the individuals.
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Uncertain prize-Bernouilli utility-sealed bid for uncertain prize. Students submitted bids for an uncertain prize. Special dice were utilized to generate a random number between 1 and 1,000. The payoff was in cents; 1,000 was interpreted as $10. Thus, the expected payoff was 500.5 cents.
The games were run seven times. Table 11 provides a statistical summary of the strategies employed. 1980 1981 1983 1984 1985 1988 1989 1991S 1991F We note that a considerable percentage of the individuals bid more than the expected value of the prize. Even with small sums of money changing hands, one must be careful in interpreting the link between utility and money. For example, in 1983 there was a bid of $10 for the prize with expected value of $5.05. I was concerned with this irrational behavior, so I asked the individual who bid the $10 for an explanation. He noted that his goal was to win the bid under all circumstances and figured that a bid of $10 would certainly be sufficient, as he estimated that no one would be as heavily motivated for a win.
Point
Stanley Marcus, a noted sales entrepreneur, commented that he once grossly overbid for a bundle of sable furs because he felt that the resultant publicity was worth far more than the extra expense.
Gaming for teaching and research
The games discussed above were all essentially abstract games, where context or story line was not really relevant. When, however, games are used to teach other topics such as economic principles, one expects to provide at least some structure beyond abstract game theory. In the use of gaming for teaching, experimentation, or training, it is still an open question as to how much framing, context, and briefing influences the outcome. John Kennedy, a former chairman of the department of psychology at Princeton and an early advocate of gaming, used to comment, half jokingly, half seriously, "You tell me what results you want, then give me control of the briefing, and I will get you your results."
Because of the complexity of human preferences and behavior, I regard the teaching of basic game theory as an immensely important first step in the formalization of the study of individual and group-conscious behavior. But in many ways, its formal strength helps to illustrate clearly both its power and its inadequacy. The use of games in class appear to be of considerable aid in involving the students in actively trying to utilize or challenge the concepts they are being taught. The games are sloppy and hardly controlled. They hold up a mirror to the student and the teacher. As actors born into a social structure, the nature of individual preferences and social norms are brought up for examination by the students in even the simplest of games. There are clear regularities in the way many of these games are played, but these regularities are not reflected in a single game theoretic solution, be it the noncooperative equilibrium or any of the cooperative or other solutions. 6 The outcome of the games played in class serve as experimental evidence that challenges or confirms the propositions being presented to the students. They are also a source for insight, suggesting other types of experiments, and sweetening the intuition. Roth (1995, p. 22) suggested several different styles in experimental gaming, including "Speaking to Theorists," "Searching for Facts (and Meaning)," and "Whispering into the Ears of Princes." All of these have their purposes and different weaknesses. They should be regarded as complementary approaches with different purposes and costs.
The use of gaming in teaching can come at a cost of less than zero because it can be an effective teaching device and can yield experimental (or at least preliminary experimental) insights as part of a joint product in the classroom. It provides an economical source for considerable replication and variation in the investigation of both individual behavior and opinion. However, from the viewpoint of optimal learning it requires probably 30 or fewer students. I have utilized several of these games with groups larger than 60, but one loses the possibility for satisfactory discussion with individual students.
Notes

